

How We Can Be Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

GLENN A. HARTZ

I can recall vividly my adolescent encounter with John Steinbeck's *The Red Pony*. I remember feeling affection and pity for the pony, disappointment and anger at its death, and a consuming hatred for the buzzard that plucks out its eye. Those emotions were so intense that they brought on a brief period of physical sickness.

Of all the fascinating philosophical issues this experience raises, three have gained the spotlight in recent discussion:

- (1) the *ontological status* of 'creatures of fiction' like the pony;
- (2) the possible *irrationality* involved in loving and hating such creatures when all the while I know they're just fictions; and
- (3) what kinds of *actions* I am performing to make the story have this gripping effect on me—say, acts of imagination or make-believe with respect to the pony.

(1) is and should remain of perennial interest. My concern is with (2) and (3).

The debate on (2) and (3) has been hampered by several confusions that I intend to put right. First, phenomenological considerations show that many of the questions have been posed and answered improperly. Second, radically disparate cases, which require different explanations, have been thrown in together and subjected to the same analysis. Third, and most decisively, the debate has been conducted in ignorance of empirical evidence concerning the role human physiology plays in emotion. That evidence shows that theories thought to be main contenders in the debate are not merely implausible, but clearly false.

A bit of history: in 1975 Colin Radford raised question (2) (about irrationality) by asking, 'How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?'¹ For over twenty years aestheticians have laboured to resolve the 'fiction paradox': *how can we get emotionally involved with fictional characters?* Radford assumed that all emotions involve

¹ Colin Radford, 'How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, suppl. vol. 49 (1975): 67–80.

attitudes towards real flesh-and-blood people. Thus concern with Anna Karenina is 'incoherent' and irreducibly paradoxical.

Green slime was joined in a most unlikely (and ill-fated) marriage with 'Anna' when Kendall Walton's 'Fearing Fictions'² appeared. Walton attempted to solve the fiction paradox by proposing an answer that falls under issue (3)—about what we *do* to get so involved. I style Walton's account the 'Make-Believe Theory'.³ Roughly, this theory says there's nothing rationally out of the way when someone finds herself emotionally worked up while playing a game of make-believe with fictional characters. Children playing 'bears' with stumps in a woods might be 'afraid' of the stumps within the game. So when a chap named Charles is watching a film depicting vicious green slime, he makes-believe the slime is dangerous and so lands in a state of 'quasi-fear'. (Charles doesn't really *fear* it if he neither believes he is in danger, nor wants to get away.) Similarly, by making-believe that Anna exists and is worthy of concern, we 'quasi-pity' her within her 'world'.⁴

I argue that there really is no paradox, and that even if there were, Walton's theory couldn't resolve it because the higher-order cognition behind 'making-believe' typically has no connection with fiction-induced emotions. And, of all the solutions to Radford's puzzle in the literature, mine is the only one able to account for the strength and vivacity of fiction-induced emotions in an onlooker who remains rational while yet knowing the situations and the people aren't real.

I consider my objections to the Make-Believe Theory annihilating. But my response to Radford's original query leaves room for debate, because it involves deep questions about rationality. Since I haven't time to develop a theory of rationality, I can only regard my position as more plausible than any alternative heretofore offered.

1. Cognitivism

One source of trouble in this debate is a particular interpretation of the cognitivist theory of emotion.

Consider first Generic Cognitivism:

² Kendall Walton, 'Fearing Fictions', *The Journal of Philosophy*, **75** (January 1978): 5–27.

³ This is more fully developed in his recent book, Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990).

⁴ Walton, *Mimesis*, p. 273.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

Generic Cognitivism: every emotion must be caused by an appropriate belief.

Thus fear must be caused by a belief that is appropriate *for that emotion*—namely, that the object feared is dangerous.

Cognitivism of this sort appears prominently in Radford's original statement of the problem. He announces '... I can only be moved by someone's plight if I believe that something terrible has happened to him. ... We have to believe in [a man's] torment to be tormented by it.'⁵ Walton also endorses this when he calls 'a principle of common sense, which ought not to be abandoned if there is any reasonable alternative' the claim that 'fear must be accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger'.⁶

Generic Cognitivism is not at issue here. I agree that for nearly all emotions, an appropriate belief is required. However, I disagree with Radford and Walton about (i) what counts as a belief and (ii) their additional requirement that the belief causing an emotion be logically consistent with all other beliefs one then holds.

(i) Radford and Walton seem to limit emotion-causing beliefs to mental states we are aware of, while a functionalist/evolutionary view knows no such limitations. The latter account sometimes attributes beliefs to human beings even if these belief-states do not show up (at least at first) as consciously-held affirmations. Typically such beliefs are states that an organism is in, about which it is not notified. It usually comes to know it has these beliefs through their behavioural manifestations.

(ii) Their 'additional requirement' leads them to hold a much more demanding version of Cognitivism than the Generic sort. Let us call the stricter version 'Rationalist Cognitivism':

Rationalist Cognitivism: every emotion must be caused by an appropriate belief that is consistent with every other belief one holds at that time.

It is Rationalist Cognitivism, not the Generic sort, that generates the fiction paradox. Radford, for instance, says weeping for Mercutio is paradoxical because 'we do not and need not at any time believe that he is a real person'; continuing:

what is necessary in other contexts, *viz.*, belief, for being moved, is not necessary here and ... how can we be saddened by and cry

⁵ Radford, 'How Can...', p. 68.

⁶ Walton, 'Fearing Fictions', pp. 6–7; see also *Mimesis*, p. 197: 'That fear necessarily involves a belief or judgment that the feared object poses a threat is a natural supposition which many standard theories of emotion endorse'; also pp. 198–9; 202–3.

over Mercutio's death knowing as we do that when he dies no one really dies?⁷

Radford thinks believing self-consciously that 'Mercutio is not a real person' is sufficient to rule out believing, in *any* sense or at any level, 'Mercutio is in peril'. And Walton's Charles is judged unfit for fear—hence rationally fit only for quasi-fear—because he says he does not believe the slime is dangerous. This disavowal is taken as sufficient to show that he does *not also* believe, in some more rudimentary way, that the slime *is* dangerous.

I argue that Rationalist Cognitivism is a mistake because *especially emotions stirred up by literature* tend to circumvent its requirements. A theory that says *all* emotions must meet them will view cases that don't as logically odd, generating a spate of new paradoxes in its wake. All such 'paradoxes' dissolve when one sees that the Rationalist Cognitivism that generated them is inconsistent with empirical and phenomenological facts about us.

We begin with a detailed critique of the Make-Believe Theory.

2. Argument from Evolution, Anatomy, and Physiology against Quasi-Emotions

I note first of all that Walton's own list of quasi-fear's qualities includes primitive, visceral sorts of emotional states. Walton says Charles 'recoils', that 'his muscles are tensed, he clutches his chair, his pulse quickens, his adrenaline flows', he 'gasps for breath' and is 'sweating' and 'involuntarily knotting [his] stomach'.⁸ That is a strength of Walton's case. For throughout philosophical discussions of this issue, stories are said to generate fear, anger, love, hate, compassion, pity, fear, horror, suspense, joy, grief, compassion, worry, and sadness. (Pride and resentment are noticeably absent.) And—as with Walton—often it is the trembly, visceral side of these that is mentioned—from Plato's sorrowing and lamenting hero who elicits sympathy, weeping and wailing,⁹ to Aristotle's thrilling with horror and melting to pity,¹⁰ to Hume's vehemence of sorrow and indigna-

⁷ Radford, 'How Can...', p. 78.

⁸ Walton, *Mimesis*, pp. 196–9.

⁹ Plato, *Republic* X, 605cd; translated by G. M. A. Grube; revised by C. D. C. Reeve—in S. M. Cohen, P. Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve (eds), *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), p. 429.

¹⁰ *On Poetry*, §14, in Milton C. Nahm (ed.), Aristotle, *On the Art of Poetry with a supplement On Music*, trans. S. H. Butcher (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979), pp. 17–8.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

tion,¹¹ to Radford's weeping for Anna,¹² to Walton's recoiling, clutching, tensing, knotting, pulse-quickenning, shrieking, adrenaline-flowing Charles. Why do we keep finding these same sorts of emotions?

Many of them appear at least in a rudimentary form very early in human development. Neonates are quite capable of rage and fear.¹³ Even 1-day-olds manifest a 'reactive cry' mechanism in response to the sound of another human's cry.¹⁴ That mechanism later becomes enmeshed in more sophisticated perceptual and cognitive functions: children as young as 10 to 14 months show distress when another child falls and hurts herself.¹⁵ From childhood we carry these 'primitive' emotions forward into adult life mostly unchanged. As Jenefer Robinson notes in an important recent study, 'more sophisticated emotional responses grow out of primitive, apparently prewired responses'¹⁶ and retain many of the responses' features.

Perhaps *that* fact is explained by the brain's structure, with the seat of reason (the neocortex) being built over top the brain's older emotion-center (the limbic system) and superimposed on the body's pre-existing autonomic nervous system. In particular, injury to and stimulation of parts of the limbic system dramatically affect an organism's capacity for fear and rage—as well as exhilaration, awe, sentimentality, love, sorrow, pain, pleasure, sexual feelings, docility, and affection.¹⁷ As Stuart Fox explains,

¹¹ David Hume, 'Of Tragedy', in E. F. Miller (ed.), *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary*, rev. ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), pp. 216–25; relevant passage at p. 220.

¹² Radford, 'How Can...', p. 75.

¹³ See evidence offered by Jenefer Robinson, 'Startle', *The Journal of Philosophy* **92** (February 1995): 53–74, at p. 60.

¹⁴ Martin L. Hoffman, 'Interaction of Affect and Cognition in Empathy', in Carroll E. Izard, Jerome Kagan, and Robert B. Zajonc (eds), *Emotions, Cognition, and Behavior* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 103–31; esp. p. 104.

¹⁵ Hoffman comments helpfully: 'We call it empathy, although the child does not really put himself in the other's place and imagine what the other is feeling. The child's response is, rather, a passive, involuntary one based on the pull of surface cues and requiring the shallowest level of cognitive processing. This simple form of empathic distress is important, however, precisely because it shows that as humans we may involuntarily and forcefully experience others' emotional states....' *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁶ Robinson, 'Startle', p. 60.

¹⁷ The first five are mentioned in Sagan, *The Dragons of Eden* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977), pp. 66–8; the last six in Gerard J. Tortora, *Principles of Human Anatomy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 519.

Glenn A. Hartz

The limbic system was derived early in the course of vertebrate evolution, and its tissue is thus phylogenetically older than the *neocortex* of the cerebral hemispheres. There are few synaptic connections between the neocortex and the structures of the limbic system, which perhaps helps to explain why we have so little conscious control over our emotions.¹⁸

Recent studies with rhesus monkeys illuminate the neocortex/limbic interface.¹⁹ Here 'frightening' or 'worrisome' conditions (like being taken away from mother) were inflicted on young animals. The pre-frontal cortex is the part of the neocortex that is centrally involved in assessing danger, and the limbic amygdala and hypothalamus respond by regulating fear. The release of the 'stress hormone' cortisol by the adrenal glands is the net result of this activity.²⁰

The adrenal glands also lie at the end of a completely different fear-related causal chain emanating from the *autonomic nervous system*. This system's sympathetic division regulates adrenaline (epinephrine) secretion, which helps manage fear. It is activated automatically and involuntarily, mediated by the action of 'autonomic motor neurons' conducting impulses away from the central nervous system.²¹

With neocortex added, overall brain states acquire cognitive complexity while yet retaining many of the involuntary elements of the limbic and autonomic nervous systems. As Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan write,

A rudimentary ability to think was superimposed on the pre-existing, genetically programmed behavioural repertoires. ... So when unexpectedly it is confronted with a predator, before anything like a thought wells up, the potential prey experiences an internal state that alerts it to its danger. That anxious, even panicky state ... includ[es], for humans, sweaty palms, increased heartbeat and muscle tension, shortened breath, hairs standing on end, ... and a strong impulse either for combat or retreat. Since in many mammals fear is produced by the same adrenaline-like

¹⁸ Stuart Ira Fox, *Human Physiology*, 4th ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown, 1993), p. 175.

¹⁹ See Ned H. Kalin, 'The Neurobiology of Fear', *Scientific American* (May 1993): 94–100.

²⁰ In particular, the hypothalamus secretes 'corticotropin-releasing hormone', which in turn spurs the limbic system's pituitary gland to secrete adrenocorticotrophic hormone—which in turn stimulates the adrenal glands to release cortisol. And cortisol prepares the body to defend itself by ensuring muscles are ready for 'fight or flight'.

²¹ See James E. Crouch, *Functional Human Anatomy* (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1985), pp. 355–8.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

molecule, it may feel pretty much the same in all of them. ... The more adrenaline in the bloodstream, up to a certain limit, the more fear the animal feels.²²

Since the neocortex could evolve only by leaving limbic and autonomic systems there, the three now work together to produce and manage emotions.

3. Verdict on Charles

Returning to Charles-the-slime-watcher: a 'panicky state' is what his looks to be. He's sweating, his heart is racing, and he's tense. Recall that Walton's proposed cause of such physiological symptoms as these was make-believe. But how could anything as cerebral and out-of-the-loop as 'make-believe' make adrenaline and cortisol flow? Given the nature of the primate brain, the true account of Charles is more likely this. Images of green slime leaping about, accompanied by ominous music, stimulate the prefrontal cortex and other areas of the brain, which automatically and involuntarily assess it as a threat the body had better prepare to meet. That is: *a belief is formed*—even though it is not consciously entertained and even though it is inconsistent with what Charles explicitly avows. From that point on, connections with flowing hormones are all hard, their mechanisms irreversible. Charles ends up worked up even though he doesn't credit that the slime is dangerous because: *conscious belief never gets consulted*.

In the brain there is a an intentional state that we might, in our rational reconstruction of the situation, describe as a functionally-defined belief, about the slime, that it is dangerous. We also attribute to Charles a functionally-defined desire to flee the slime, manifest in his 'recoiling' reaction. The fact that conscious thought can head off the behaviour this desire tends towards—can keep Charles in the theatre—is compatible with his having the desire. (Radford's account of hiding under the seat and escaping to the lavatories during his first encounter with *The Beast with the Five Fingers* is quite telling in this regard, and makes the same point: he *did* desire to get away, it was *the beast* he desired to get away from, and he feared *for himself*.²³)

Note that Walton's account leaves it a complete mystery why

²² Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan, *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors: A Search for Who We Are* (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 110.

²³ Colin Radford, 'Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53 (Winter 1995): 71–5.

Charles bothers to recoil if in fact he knows all along he's only playing a game. Walton seems to admit as much when he says that 'his recoiling is not deliberate', but that he might 'shriek deliberately' as a sign he's 'blatantly playing along with the fiction'.²⁴ That leaves the recoiling—which is on Walton's own showing one of the main features of quasi-fear²⁵—completely unaccounted for by the 'playing' that is its supposed cause.

No doubt some will remain unconvinced by my solution. So, using the artifice of a dialogue, I respond to a recalcitrant sceptic.

Objector: What exactly is Charles afraid of?

Answer: The slime.

O: But Charles disagrees. He says he doesn't think the slime is dangerous.

A: I know. He isn't aware of the belief that the slime is dangerous, but he can follow me when I tell him why I attribute it to him. I point to his sweaty palms, his knotting stomach and racing pulse. I note that fear typically mediates threatening inputs and physical symptoms like these. Charles responds, 'Yes, I did say "Boy, was I scared!" didn't I? I guess at some level I knew I was scared, though some aestheticians have objected. They say that no matter how intense my fear seemed, it wasn't really *fear*.'²⁶ They seem to think me mad when I turn around and say that on reflection I don't believe the slime is dangerous....'

O: We'll get to irrationality presently. For now answer this: aren't you giving up Walton's 'principle of common sense', which requires a belief that one is in danger for each case of fear?

A: No. *My* Charles has that belief. I am of course denying *Rationalist* Cognitivism, according to which he can't have it because he also believes, in a more self-conscious way, that the slime is not dangerous.

O: Walton insists, while you deny, that beliefs are attributed to people for things they *do*, not for 'automatic responses' like sweating and knotting.²⁷ As he says, '... there is no need to attribute beliefs (or desires) to Charles that will render these responses reasonable'.²⁸

A: There is indeed a deep difference between us. It shows that Walton isn't sympathetic to a functionalist account of belief of the sort I'm offering. But set that aside. Just consider this. Aesthetics would make a great mistake if it simply turned its back on these 'responses'—if it regarded them as beyond the pale of rationality.

²⁴ Walton, *Mimesis*, p. 246.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 196–8.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

For often the difference, between, say, good and bad writing is its ability to move us *physiologically*. Compare ‘a pony given to a child as a gift dies tragically at the end of the story’ with

Below, in one of the little clearings in the brush, lay the red pony. In the distance, Jody could see the legs moving slowly and convulsively. And in a circle around him stood the buzzards, waiting for the moment of death they know so well.²⁹

My paraphrase is a numbing failure, while Steinbeck’s artful sentences often evoke a visceral sense of distress and pity as the buzzards move in.

The same goes for art generally. Good art not only gains our intellectual, rational admiration; it often elicits involuntary, intense physiological responses. Such responses follow causally from more sophisticated cognitive judgments, and with them form a unity that *is* the overall aesthetic response. In sundering response from judgment, Walton presumes that the entire cognitive weight lies in the judgment. The responses seem to be mere ancillary, non-cognitive tag-alongs of no consequence to reason (and hence aesthetics).

By contrast, I want to capture a rational dimension of the responses by seeing them as suitable responses, given the nature of the judgments causing them. Recently Thomas Hoving said that his reason for selecting certain works as among the greatest of all time was that they ‘had bowled me over visually and emotionally’,³⁰ adding that he looked forward to returning to each work for ‘shock after beautiful shock’. If the ‘bowlings over’ and the ‘shocks’—also his ‘romantic frissons’ before the Sphinx³¹—are of such crucial importance in making decisions like this, then they seem inextricably bound up with the judgments. The *whole package*—thought (‘romantic’) and physiology (‘frissons’)—is the emotional state that aesthetics has to explain. (We’d be bewildered if Hoving reported ‘romantic giggles’.)

In the case of Charles, we should see his fear of slime as caused in part by the film’s artistic success. (If *The Green Slime* were a homemade video starring a garden hose as the slime, the responses wouldn’t be forthcoming.) So it *is* reasonable, broadly speaking, for him to recoil, shriek, and knot because the film is succeeding in presenting the slime as threatening.

²⁹ John Steinbeck, *The Red Pony*, in *The Long Valley* (Garden City: Sun Dial Press, 1941), p. 237.

³⁰ Thomas Hoving, *Greatest Works of Art of Western Civilization* (New York: Artisan, 1997), p. 5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Don't misunderstand. I don't think all emotions are *reducible* to physiological responses. Most—perhaps all—of them are not. But I think some emotions involve a strong visceral element that is an aspect of the emotion itself.

O: Does Charles also have desires with respect to the slime?

A: Yes. Charles's desire to get away from the slime is apparent again in the functional role it plays in mediating threatening inputs and behavioural outputs like recoiling and tensing. Charles is only vaguely, if at all, aware of this desire. His strongest desire is to stay and watch the movie. Unlike the young Radford, he is able, with this desire, to fight off the other, hidden one—manifest as bodily solicitations to flight.

O: But then you end up saying Charles is irrational—or at least massively self-deceived. He has logically incompatible beliefs *and* desires! He was in better shape with make-believe, where the slime is only make-believable dangerous, and he only make-believable wants to get away. Make-beliefs and -desires, since they aren't full-fledged beliefs and desires, are harmless to one's rationality even if they're logically incompatible with one's actual beliefs and desires. They're only *indulged* for the sake of the game.

A: The only reason Charles seems better off with make-believe is that the concept of make-believe is so obscure that it's impossible to tell how it is related to rationality. We should stick with what we understand—beliefs and desires. Charles can only be held rationally accountable for the mental states he is aware of. He cannot be charged with epistemic misconduct as long as the beliefs and desires that conflict with those he is aware of are hidden from his introspective gaze. On finding out, from his own physical symptoms, that there are, deep inside, beliefs at variance with his thoughts, he may have some adjusting to do. But he is much relieved when I tell him such states are quite normal, given the structure of the brain.

O: Are you just arguing about terminology? Walton *defines* quasi-fear as a 'physiological-psychological state' that involves such things as tensed muscles, clutching, a quickening pulse, and flowing adrenaline.³²

A: I'm glad you pointed that out, for now I can show it's no mere logomachy. Walton uses 'quasi-fear' to pick out *precisely* those aspects of Charles's state that are known by empirical tests to be *furthest removed* from make-believe. For obvious reasons, we'd expect adrenaline-secretion and so on, which humans share with rhesus monkeys and many other mammals, *not* to require playing games of make-believe. Since Walton's theory leans the

³² Walton, *Mimesis*, p. 196.

Moved by *Anna Karenina*, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

other way, it is more than hopelessly implausible. It is demonstrably false.³³

4. Verdict on Anna

Looking beyond fear: pity for a baby erupts from hearing it cry, and is hard to shut down even when reason advises, 'that's just a recording'. So feeble are the powers of 'make-believe' that anger at Scrooge's meanness is impenetrable to the reminder, 'this guy is a fiction'. Trapped in a room near the television, we overhear the soundtrack of a network mini series. Quite against our will—in the teeth of our best efforts *not* to 'make-believe'—we find the storyline and 'sad music' stirring up pity and fear for the beleaguered indians, and hatred for the cruel settlers. All the while we're telling ourselves that we don't *care* about the story or the people—that we despise such cheap imitations of art. But the responses are impenetrable even to our insistent conscious believings. So far are they from being argued with.

So, to return to *Anna*: the pity that erupts during reading, though caused by thoughts about the story, is often as automatic, passive, involuntary, and forceful as the 1-year-old's barely cogitated fellow-feeling directed towards her friend. By ignoring the fact that adult emotions retain vestiges of primitive responses, philosophers have found paradox where there is none. Robinson's emphasis on a response model for emotions is given colossal empirical impetus by these reflections on anatomy and physiology. To be sure, Robinson is aware of the amygdala and its role in producing fear,³⁴ but she merely uses it as one bit of evidence to show 'emotions are not necessarily dependent upon cognitions. ...' The implications are much more revolutionary, if I am right. Robinson even mentions explicitly 'a compassionate response to *Anna Karenina*'. She does not connect this with the primitive response side of compassion, however. Instead, she heads for the other end of the spectrum—classifying it as an extremely sophisticated emotion that requires 'complex cognitive activity', that is, conceiving the situation in 'propositional

³³ Simo Säätelä has noted the disconnection between quasi-fear and make-believe, but leaves it as just one more flaw in the details of Walton's theory. I say it's fatal. Simo Säätelä, 'Fiction, Make-Believe and Quasi Emotions', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 34 (January 1994): 25–34. On p. 28 he says that Walton's quasi-fear is more closely akin to a 'reaction' like flinching than to make-believe.

³⁴ Robinson, 'Startle', p. 61.

terms'.³⁵ She sees only the higher cognitive side of an emotion which, as she herself implicitly argues, builds on a response as primitive as 'startle'.

The Objector returns:

O: Do you genuinely pity Anna?

A: Yes.

O: But you admit you don't believe she exists.

A: Right. She is just an intentional object, having no more or less ontological status than the unicorn I'm thinking about right now, and I am quite aware of this. Such things can be objects of emotion with no problem. They are objects within their proper 'domain of discourse'.³⁶

O: But you don't believe *in* unicorns.

A: No, but I have beliefs about them. For instance, I for one am not ashamed to say I believe unicorns have one horn. I also believe Anna Karenina is a woman, even though I don't believe such a woman actually exists. If you want to, you could say I am imagining the unicorn and Anna, but I hope we're over attaching Walton's make-believe sense to 'imagines'. I think many philosophers are worried that belief-attributions must be geared into actions, and so 'imagines' is safer than 'believes'. But that is silly. It is at least plausible to suppose that rational actions must be explained (in part) by beliefs, but it is nonsense to think that every belief must issue in action. There are thousands of beliefs that remain quite occurrently inert³⁷ and are beliefs all the same—say my belief that that unicorn is *not* suffering unjustly. Others, even when known to be fictional, can trip mechanisms that cause us to get upset: *your eyeball is being cut by a razor*. There, see? You didn't *will* the sudden chill that came over you, though you did entertain the belief. The chill was caused by mechanisms outside voluntary control. Briefly: in the context of reading the novel or watching the play, I come to believe Anna suffers unjustly, and that belief trips mechanisms that cause the pity—and maybe even sadness and weeping as well.

O: Are you aware of this belief?

A: Yes, typically—unlike the belief about slime.

O: Do you also have desires with respect to her?

³⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

³⁶ For some development of this concept in reference to fictional characters, see L. Jonathan Cohen, 'The Individuation of Proper Names', in Zak van Straaten (ed.), *Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 140–63.

³⁷ Of course all beliefs will need to be dispositionally active, else there'd be no possible way to discover them.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

A: Sure. As Jenefer Robinson has suggested,³⁸ a novel's power lies partly in its ability to get us to care about and want various outcomes for its characters. We are perfectly well aware of these desires in most cases: we're drawn into the plot and hang on to the end because of them. Note also that emotions often depend on wants: frustrated desires lead to negative feelings; fulfilled longings to pleasant ones. The onlooker comes to care about Anna's fate as the novel proceeds, and that's why, when she takes her own life, there is pity, sorrow—even weeping—at the end. This desire, unlike the one to flee the slime, is not connected with the adrenal glands and hormone secretion. But it may be part of a causal chain that eventually triggers involuntary lachrymal activity. You see *how* different are the cases of Anna and slime?

O: Well, just in the case of beliefs, can you be *rational* in simultaneously believing 'Anna suffers unjustly' and 'Anna doesn't really exist'? Radford, in upholding Rationalist Cognitivism, says no.

A: I say yes, though defending that is a long business. But consider: you winced when you thought of your eyeball's confrontation with a razor even though you *believed* 'my eyeball is *not* being cut'. There is no mystery or incoherence in that. While the analogy isn't perfect—as the eyeball case has to do with automatic fear-related mechanisms—it shows pity for Anna has real-life analogues that pass the rationality test. It is perfectly natural and even predictable that we should get into such states, given our composition. ...

Stepping back now into my own persona: I came to this topic strongly inclined to the view that talk of fictional characters is metaphorical and should not be indulged in metaphysics. But the inertia of my functionalist theory of mind carries me inexorably on to 'Anna'. The emotion-generating mechanisms seem, in fact, to preserve the intentionality of the beliefs that tripped them quite regardless of whether we self-consciously acknowledge those objects to be fictions. (It is the *beleagured indians* that I pity, the *buzzard* that I hate—even though I very well know they're fictions.) Moreover, if a functional analysis says Charles believes the slime is dangerous, then the same analysis will say that I believe Anna suffers unjustly. Belief in the slime and the 'Beast' seems a bit easier to accept, since at least their *images* exist on the screen. By contrast, 'Anna' seems an ontological extravagance. (Still, this difference is more apparent than real, given that a *reader's* fear of Beast or slime is exactly analogous to a reader's pity for Anna. In neither case is there anything in the world beyond descriptions.)

³⁸ Jenefer Robinson, 'Comments on Glenn Hartz' "How we can be moved by *Anna Karenina*—and Green Slime". Presented at the Central Division American Philosophical Association meeting, 7 May 1998.

My reservations are somewhat mollified by noting that my 'Anna' is on all fours with purely mental objects like unicorns, safely stowed away in the realm of fictional discourse. In addition, having Anna as an intentional object purchases phenomenological plausibility for my account. For one point that is so very much insisted upon by many in this debate³⁹ is that it is *Anna* that we pity, and not someone real who is like her, or her 'fate',⁴⁰ or a mere description.

5. Evidence from Psychology against Quasi-Emotions

Psychologists routinely and reliably use fictional stories to induce emotions in their subjects. For instance, a study of compliance in social psychology successfully used fictional stories to induce happiness (increasing compliance) and anger (decreasing it).⁴¹ The 'stimulus materials' consisted of 'mood stories' concerning a young female art student. In the happy story she receives a scholarship, in the neutral story nothing consequential happens. Whereas the

anger-inducing story ... began by describing an art student in ways designed to elicit sympathy and liking for her. Then it described a series of unfair events resulting in someone else receiving an art scholarship that should have gone to this student.⁴²

The anger-inducing story was specifically designed, as I would say, to trip the mechanisms that control emotions that are in turn geared into diminished compliance. The researchers themselves are completely blind to the supposedly dramatic split between fiction- and fact-born affects. Care was taken, they say, to sustain the claim that the 'mood stories' were the only cause of happiness and anger.⁴³

³⁹ It won't do, Radford writes, to say we feel pity merely for someone in an Anna-like situation, since 'We weep for *her*. ... We pity her, feel for her and our tears are shed for her'. Radford, 'How Can...', p. 75. Walton also, in *Mimesis*, p. 204: '... to consider the experience commonly characterized as 'pity for Anna' to be merely pity for real people "like" her ... does not do it justice. It is no accident that we speak of sympathizing with or grieving for *Anna*'.

⁴⁰ See Don Mannison, 'On Being Moved by Fiction', *Philosophy* **60** (January 1985): 71–87.

⁴¹ Sandra Milberg and Margaret S. Clark, 'Moods and Compliance', *British Journal of Social Psychology* **27** (1988): 79–90.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴³ The authors write, 'By comparing compliance in the mood conditions with compliance in the conditions in which no message was delivered, we can conclude that our manipulation of happiness not only increased compliance but was, in fact, necessary in the present study in order to get any compliance'—*ibid.*, p. 87.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

And, the authors add, 'we cannot be sure that this manipulation [the anger-inducing story] did not also increase feelings of sadness'.⁴⁴

Contrast that interpretation with the one Make-Believe Theorists must inflict on the same data. Presumably, they'd say the study concerned quasi-happiness, quasi-sympathy, quasi-anger, and quasi-sadness. The subjects never had beliefs or desires focused on an actual art student; so they were only in make-believe emotional states. That is wildly counterintuitive. In addition, it sorts ill with the fact that the emotions in the study had a direct connection with belief- and desire-driven *behaviour* (compliance). Quasi-emotions—cordoned off in their little 'game'—are not to be expected so reliably to be driving rational action.

6. Argument from Phenomenology against Quasi-Emotions

There was nothing, other than reading, that I *did* to cause my violent reaction to *The Red Pony*. It *happened to me*. Some pretty awesome forces had been unleashed by artful sentences that conveyed thoughts whose intentional objects found their way into the resulting emotions. Even the surface phenomenology suggests passivity rather than activity—which stands in marked contrast to Walton's claim that real emotions always result from something we *do*.

But some friends of Make-Believe may yet remain unconvinced. I can hear a critic saying, 'Do you accord no role whatever to make-believe and imagination in response to stories? You leave Hamlet out of the play!'

Reply: make-believe or entering imaginatively into a (possibly fictional) state of affairs often plays a role in the overall process of responding to stories. Against the Make-Believe Theory, however, I hold that this role is almost never an *emotion-generating* role. Instead, it is often more like releasing oneself to follow one's *already launched* emotional responses, indulging them and not shutting them down with philistine reminders about how silly it is to cringe and laugh at fictions. The famous 'willful suspension of disbelief' is, I think, most often a decision to get out of the way of one's natural credulity and let it carry one further and further into involvement in the story.

There are exceptional individuals—like Radford's father⁴⁵—who won't let beliefs and emotions get started just because they know the stories are fictional. So perhaps conscious thought can throttle the

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 87.

⁴⁵ Colin Radford, 'Replies to Three Critics', *Philosophy* **64** (1989): 93–7.

process at the start: the ‘already-flowing emotions’ I’ve mentioned may presuppose a certain amount of initial acquiescence. The point is that once one has acquiesced and the emotions are flowing, the phenomenology suggests that one does not prod them along with make-believe.

Those with a more typical initial acquiescence often find the emotions, once set going, are out of control and have a life of their own. My teenage daughter convinces me to accompany her to a ‘tear-jerker’ movie with a fictional script. I try to keep an open mind, but find it wholly lacking in artistry. I can’t wait for it to end. Still, tears come welling up at the tragic climax, and, cursing, I brush them aside and hide in my hood on the way to the car. Phenomenologically, this description is perfectly apt. But it is *completely* inconsistent with the Make-Believe Theory, which says emotional flow is always causally dependent on make-believe. Indeed, we could generate another paradox from this case if we hold stubbornly to the Make-Believe Theory: how can someone who forswears any imaginative involvement in a series of fictional events yet respond to them with tears of sadness!⁴⁶

But it’s not a paradox; it’s just another reason to reject that Theory. Beliefs about the story are among the factors that activate mechanisms that cause emotions. But those mechanisms are not under our control, and the beliefs that trip them do not await Reason’s permission before proceeding.

7. Comparison with Other Solutions

In ‘Fear without Belief’, John Morreall’s solution to the question about how Charles gets so shook up is the weak suggestion that horror movies create ‘sympathetic fear’ for the people in the movie.⁴⁷ To this Walton can reply that he specifically says the slime is coming after the viewer rather chasing terror-stricken actors.⁴⁸ Charles seems to fear *for himself*, and this is left unexplained.

The same shortcoming befalls Richard Moran’s masterly discussion of the various roles imagination plays in response to literature.⁴⁹ Moran claims that cases of direct frontal visual assault are unusual,

⁴⁶ The Make-Believe Theory can’t even call this ‘quasi-sadness’, for *ex hypothesi* it hasn’t the requisite cause.

⁴⁷ John Morreall, ‘Fear Without Belief’, *The Journal of Philosophy* **90** (July, 1993): 359–66.

⁴⁸ Walton, *Mimesis*, p. 196.

⁴⁹ Richard Moran, ‘The Expression of Feeling in Imagination’, *The Philosophical Review* **103** (January 1994), 75–106.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

that more typical situations involve 'gruesome attacks' on 'the characters on the screen'.⁵⁰ *These* attacks, he says, do not 'stimulate the sense of paradox' as much, since they generate 'empathetic' fear and horror in the same way that we might be horrified when someone else gashes their hand before our eyes.⁵¹ Moran is right about *those* cases, but Walton's original situation is not so terribly idiosyncratic that it can be *ignored*. His challenge remains unanswered.

Alec Hyslop admirably puts Walton under pressure for allowing quasi-fear to remain so obscure.⁵² He says we can respond intelligibly to Anna with real pity even if (*pace* Radford) we don't believe she exists provided we are 'imagining that she is real'. But paradox remains here: Hyslop's imaginer knows she is *only* imagining. So the strength and persistence of her pity remains unaccountable. Bijoy Boruah's solution falls to the same criticism, since it says imagination alone can transform the 'fictional content' of a thought about, say, a painting of 'an enraged lion' into a something 'akin to a thought about an analogous real-life situation'⁵³ (that is, about a real lion). The mind is thus granted miraculous powers of noetic alchemy. Since the solution is obviously false, Radford and Walton remain unanswered.

Peter Lamarque's recent work develops an account of how one can land in genuine emotional states by entertaining thoughts 'derived in suitable ways from the propositional content of an original fictional presentation'.⁵⁴ This helps explain the origin and nature of intentional objects that are the focus of fiction-born emotions. It also rightly insists on genuine fear rather than quasi-fear.

But on the question of the force and vivacity of such emotions, Lamarque's account is weak. He says that 'belief and disbelief stay in the background when we are engaged with fiction. Vivid imagining replaces belief'.⁵⁵ This is the same tack as that taken by Hyslop and Boruah, and has the same drawbacks.

Most importantly, Lamarque endorses Walton's assumption of

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁵² Alec Hyslop, 'Emotions and Fictional Characters', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 64 (September 1986): 289–97; quotation from p. 297.

⁵³ Bijoy H. Boruah, *Fiction and Emotion: A Study in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 103. See Moran's related point, that 'vividness' of imagination isn't enough to account for our getting caught up in a story: 'Feeling in Imagination', pp. 87–9.

⁵⁴ Peter Lamarque, *Fictional Points of View* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), quotation from pp. 123–4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

Rationalist Cognitivism—so all doors that might lead to a solution are shut against him. Lamarque writes that ‘*Charles does not fear the slime* because he knows there is no such thing’,⁵⁶ and this leaves his account without an appropriate intentional object for Charles’s fear:

Charles’s imaginings, his mental representations, frighten him. But what is he afraid of? He is not, as I said, strictly speaking, afraid of *the slime* because he does not believe it to be real. ... we need to distinguish what Charles finds frightening ... (slimy things)..., what he is frightened *by*, which specifies the cause of the fear; and what he is frightened *of*, which specifies the intentional content of the fear. ... What he is frightened of is *the imagined slime*, which is not a mysterious ‘fictitious entity’, ... but a kind of imagining.⁵⁷

But if the intentional object is ‘the imagined slime’, his (genuinely) *fearing* it cries out for explanation, since its merely imaginary status is naked before the mind. Vivid imagining is powerless to transform *imagined* slime into something threatening. Trying to marshall plausibility for the claim that Charles is really afraid of the slime, and searching for an appropriate ‘propositional content’ for the fear, Lamarque writes,

It is not that he is afraid that *this* (slime) will devour him, because he does not believe what he is seeing is real. ... He vividly imagines *that he is being or is about to be attacked by such a [ferocious] slime*. ... It seems a short step from entertaining the thought that something bad (being devoured by slime) *might* happen to him and imagining it *actually happening* to him.⁵⁸

Of course this ‘short step’ is actually a very long one—as long as the gap between Boruah’s two lions.⁵⁹

On the evolutionary front, Lamarque is open to such arguments:

... perhaps there could even be an evolutionary explanation for why Charles, as a human being, should be frightened of slimy

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 125.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 126.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 128.

⁵⁹ Also, the content specified here removes the term ‘imagined’ (which Lamarque originally placed in the intentional object’s description) from ‘slime’, leaving it as the act of imagining ‘such a slime’. This makes it look as if Charles is actually fearing a real-life slime *like* the one before him, and that is what makes this such a ‘small step’, I suppose. But I side with those who insist that the slime Charles is responding to is this very slime before him, and not a real-life correlate. Thus I attribute to Charles a fear of *this* slime, not of ‘such a slime’ or of an ‘imagined slime’.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

things. ... The point is only that nothing, given the data of the case, counts theoretically against Charles having real fear.⁶⁰

With this he is unable, however, to carry the day against Walton because he merely notes a possible evolutionary rationale for, and the absence of compelling reasons against, genuine fear in Charles. I have given such an evolutionary argument—one that is *completely independent of aesthetic theory*. Thus, with the collapse of Walton's rationale for quasi-fear, the claim that Charles is afraid is now sustained.

Finally, Alex Neill rightly notes that there is nothing outside of Walton's theory that requires Charles to make-believe the slime is threatening.⁶¹ Hesitantly, in a footnote, he makes a point similar to mine when he says clutching and heavy breathing '*might* be thought of', not as signs of make-believe, but as 'proto-desires' to escape—in which case Charles is actually afraid.⁶² But he veers away from this position in his final verdict, saying that Charles is neither afraid nor quasi-afraid, but 'shocked and startled and alarmed by the movie'.⁶³ This is unsatisfactory for four reasons.

(i) It ignores our commonsense intuition—bolstered by a functionalist account of belief and desire—that Charles is afraid. Charles suffers more than mere shock and startle and alarm: on *that* point Walton is right.

(ii) The fact that adrenaline secretion is brought into the case makes it extremely plausible that this is the same emotion—fear—that is attributed to our evolutionary forebears when they secrete this substance during times of stress.

(iii) Neill solves the question only to have it reappear immediately. Doesn't shock require a belief about the object one is shocked by? And isn't that object the slime? To shunt this question aside, Neill tries a desperate manoeuvre. He invokes a Walton-esque distinction between 'reactions' ('things that Charles *suffers* rather than *does*') and 'actions', where reactions like being shocked and startled are noncognitive—neither emotions nor quasi-emotions, needing neither beliefs nor make-beliefs. Like the Walton move, this destroys the integrity of the onlooker's emotional state. Trying to marshal plausibility, Neill mentions the 'camera angles, editing, music' that directors of horror movies use to induce shock. He writes,

[Charles] describes himself as afraid because the feelings and sensations that typically go with being shocked and startled can ...

⁶⁰ Lamarque, *Fictional*, p. 126.

⁶¹ Alex Neill, 'Fear, Fiction and Make-Believe', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 49 (Winter 1991): 47–56; esp. p. 54.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 56, note 14.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

feel very much like some of the feelings and sensations characteristic of fear. However, he is mistaken; and there is nothing more problematic about this than there is about my mistakenly identifying what is in fact the feeling of my belt-buckle pressing into my stomach as the feeling of a perforated appendix.⁶⁴

But of course there's a great deal 'more problematic'. (a) The analogy is completely irrelevant: it compares mistaking one non-cognitive pressure for another non-cognitive pressure, with mistaking non-cognitive shock for a cognitive emotion. (b) Unlike cases of non-cognitive shock (say, in response to a sudden explosion on the sound-track), *this* shock has an intentional object. That object is the slime, *not* the movie.⁶⁵ (c) By invoking techniques specific to cinema, Neill narrows the scope of his solution dramatically. It becomes completely irrelevant to readers who are afraid of objects described in novels, whereas Walton certainly wants to include readers of *The Green Slime* within the scope of the problem.

(iv) After all the work he's done to get Charles to suffer shock rather than fear, Neill admits that he has no idea how to use this technique on emotions other than fear. Thus, 'Our "*pity*" for fictional characters, for example, seems likely to resist adequate redescription in anything like such terms'.⁶⁶ By contrast, my account is quite fertile when taken beyond fear.

8. Conclusion

Phenomenological and empirical considerations converge on a single account—a sign that it's not merely better than others, but very likely *true*.

Up to now Radford has rightly insisted that his question has not been answered. But now it has. It is not the answer he was looking for. It turns the problem back on *Radford* and all those who inflict Rationalist Cognitivism on emotions. The incoherence he is so proud to attribute to all of us is merely an artefact of his own stub-

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁶⁵ Radford gets it almost right recently: 'can this [move] help Neill, if my shock and alarm was not caused by a sudden noise or a fall or the poor direction of the film but by the terrifying monster on the screen?' (I say 'almost right' because he keeps this narrowly focused on cinema—the monster is *on the screen* rather than a mere intentional object—and he has the *image* as the cause rather than the mental object.) Radford, 'Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy', p. 73.

⁶⁶ Neill, 'Fear, Fiction and Make-Believe', p. 55.

Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

born demand that blind emotion-causing mechanisms in the brain abide by pre-conceived rational strictures. Unremarkably, the mechanisms refuse. They *just do* respond to the pity- and fear-inducing aspects of stories, overlooking the existential status of the objects pitied and the unreality of the situations feared.⁶⁷ (If they did not, consider how many typical aesthetic responses would be impossible, and how impoverished our lives would be.)

Especially in recent discussions, Radford courts what I can only describe as a sort of *aesthetic misanthropy*. He seems aware of how meaningful these emotions are when he writes that they are ‘so ‘natural’, ‘proper’, constitutive of a full response to and hence appreciation of what is so important and valuable in a worthwhile human life’.⁶⁸ But he says all that simply to ridicule it: ‘Certainly these emotions could not—cannot—be *incoherent!*’ He says he can’t understand why philosophers so vehemently contest this claim in particular.

I think I know why. It’s because that claim seems to involve turning one’s back on humanity itself. Another sign that something has gone fundamentally wrong comes out in Radford’s claim that he is ‘ashamed to report’⁶⁹ that he hid from the Beast—as if our finest aesthetic thinking should rightly lead us to look down on all those end up in tears over a story or trembling before monsters. He seems to put the whole thing down to immaturity and childishness.⁷⁰

I find I have no such option with *The Red Pony*. On rereading it just now I found myself again breaking into a sweat and very much in distress as the pony’s condition worsens, its hair goes dead, and the end draws nigh. I even tried some grown-up cognitive therapy to get myself back into the ranks of the noetically pure: I kept

⁶⁷ See Radford, ‘How Can We Be Moved...?’ p. 72, where his ‘third solution’ that appeals to ‘brute facts about human beings’ is turned aside by asking how people can be moved by fiction in ways that vary dramatically with the way they are moved in real life. This third solution is really the one I’m offering him. But I have made it plausible by giving evidence that this is how we’re built physically rather than a mere blank appeal to cold fact.

⁶⁸ Colin Radford, ‘The Incoherence and Irrationality of Philosophers’, *Philosophy* **65** (1990): 349–54; quotations from p. 349.

⁶⁹ Radford, ‘Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy’, p. 72.

⁷⁰ Thus Alex Neill, in ‘Emotional Responses to Fiction: Reply to Radford’, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* **53** (Winter 1995): 75–8, gives Walton too much in admitting that a movie spectator is ‘probably irrationally’ afraid of the fictional monster—‘especially if she is a child’ (p. 77). No. Age is mostly irrelevant, because plenty of adults fear the same sorts of fictions and yet should not be subjected to a charge of irrationality.

telling myself there never was such a pony. But all in vain. The mechanisms never grew up: hard-wired devices can hardly be expected to mature in parallel with the conscious mind.

I feel somewhat sheepish in my confession: a lone voice for the unwashed masses against the sophisticated forces of reason. If I am judged guilty of shame and incoherence, I hold my head high—and *so much the worse for a theory that would transform a high moment of aesthetic sensibility into a noxious, regrettable lapse*. Again, Radford writes: ‘we are irrational, inconsistent, and incoherent in being moved to pity for fictional characters ... and we are nonetheless moved (of course)’.⁷¹ Of course! so weak are the powers of reason in us that we poor, hapless, fumbling creatures are moved. He seems rather to glory in the incoherence.

I do not rejoice in it. It is not a sign of the weakness of reason—rather of its overweening influence. *This* ‘incoherence’ does not prove a want of reason in humans generally. Instead, it ironically points back at the accuser—to an unhealthy *overabundance* of Reason in the philosopher, and a disturbing tendency to hide behind its good name while inveighing against ‘the deep’. I’m afraid the dogmatic slumbers are with us still. To *our* shame, too much of our time is spent in the Ivory Tower, stipulating rational constraints on subjects whose empirical limits we have not looked into beforehand—or have chosen to ignore.

Radford’s question has endured because it’s a first-rate philosophical question. But not every question raised in philosophy can be answered there. The stargazer who first dared ask what everything is made of ultimately bequeathed a legacy not to philosophy, but to physics. I very much suspect that the *real* answer to Radford lies, not in the esoterica of aesthetic theory, but in the brutally technical details of cognitive neuroscience.⁷²

Ohio State University

⁷¹ Radford, ‘Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy’, p. 75. In response, Neill rightly asks why a strategy that attributes irrationality to humans is seen as a favourite option rather than a ‘last resort’. See his ‘Emotional Responses to Fiction...’, p. 76.

⁷² Thanks to Ralph Hunt for invaluable suggestions, and to Noël Carroll, Tim Berra, Catherine Lord, Peter Lamarque, Kathleen Schmidt, Justin D’Arms, Kendall Walton, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Michele Alexander, Jenefer Robinson, and Bobby R. Dixon for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts.